The Gerd Part 2

Challenging the Egyptian hydro-hegemony of the GERD is not the only opportunity that the GERD presents to Ethiopia. Estimates of 15,000 jobs for Ethiopians created and more when facilities are established; millions of USD Dollars in electrical exports to Sudan and Djibouti; and a shift away from biomass fuel towards hydropower will reduce environmental and health impacts. The GERD undoubtedly provides opportunities to Ethiopia however, I want to illuminate the less explored opportunities that the GERD offers to downstream riparian states.

 

A series of articles concerned by the GERD’s filling stages published in 2020-2021 dominate media discourses and cast a negative light on the prospects of the GERD for downstream states. Headlines such as “The controversy over the GERD”; “Nile Basin’s GERD dispute creates risks for Egypt, Sudan and beyond”; and “Egypt facing ‘existential threat’ due to Ethiopia’s GERD on Nile” churn an even greater media frenzy and force only one side of the story down the throats of media consumers. In reality, the GERD will provide benefits to both Sudan and Egypt.

 

Firstly, the GERD can be viewed as a symbol of prosperity for not only Ethiopia but Sudan as well. Sudan’s irrigated farming systems cover about 1.9 million hectares and are mostly irrigated from the Nile to produce crops such as cotton, groundnuts, and sugarcane. Based on an assumed model of irrigation expansion (Figure 1) there is an expected increase in Sudan’s accumulated GDP by US$47-83 billion between 2020-2060 resulting from increased crop output due to agricultural expansion. This is, however, subject to changes in the timeline of the schemes and the calculation does not include the negative health and environmental impacts of the GERD.

Figure 1: general features and potential irrigation schemes in Sudan downstream of the GERD.

Moreover, the GERD will benefit Sudan and Egypt by removing silt and sediment by regulating water flow which will improve the efficiency of hydropower, decrease maintenance costs, and reduce the need for dredging. In Egypt for example, this is shown to be able to prolong the life of the Aswan High Dam reservoir, increasing its storage capacity. Finally, the GERD offers a strategic opportunity for wider Nile cooperation which is arguably a catalyst for ‘beyond water’ opportunities like integration of markets and trade. Thus, presenting a chance for cooperation rather than assuming conflict the GERD begins to exhibit how riparian states can collaborate despite past and current tension. I will delve into this in more detail in my next post.

 

This is not to say that there are no risks that threaten downstream states such as the 4-year filling process sharply reducing streamflow to Sudan and Egypt. But it seems that through both effective transboundary cooperation and the adoption of new water management strategies action can be taken to mitigate these risks. For example, Egypt adopting both a water management policy and new water resource alternatives will conserve their supplies and reduce their dependency on the Nile. This post has hopefully revealed why the domination of negative and doom-like imagery chosen by the press is misguided and that solely perpetuating ideas that the GERD will only catalyse inescapable risks for Sudan and Egypt is wrong.