Despite lingering post-colonial tensions between riparian states, plans to construct the largest hydropower project on the Blue Nile river, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were introduced by Ethiopia in April 2011. Over a decade of planning, construction and filling leaves Ethiopia having already launched the power production stage, first generating electricity in Feb 2022. I want to highlight to you in today's blog: Ethiopia’s relationship with China, the purpose of the dam, and how through the project Ethiopia is challenging the hydro-hegemony of Egypt discussed in my last post.
Greater political strength established through economic growth and new trade connections with China has resulted in Ethiopia’s ability to self-fund large-scale projects. Figures estimating the costs of the GERD assert that roughly USD$4.8 billion was invested into the project and that this figure accounted for (10% of Ethiopia’s GDP in 2013). Granting loans of up to USD$652 million in 2017, China has been a significant player in the construction of the dam with Chinese companies undertaking construction work for the GERD.
Figure one: The GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM (GERD).
The GERD is also seen as a challenge to the Egyptian hydro-hegemony of the Nile’s resources. This is primarily due to the extensive amount of hydropower the dam will be able to provide. With the inflow from the Blue Nile to the GERD, there is a potential production of 13,629 GWh per annum. This transformational approach to tackling the deficit of national electricity the dam will provide for the 70% of Ethiopia’s population who currently live without electricity. Furthermore, through the securing of Sudanese support for the project, in which President Omar Al-Bashir offered his alliance for the GERD’s completion, Ethiopia managed to challenge the historical alliance between Sudan and Egypt on issues along the Nile. Finally, the monstrous, 170m high, 74 billion cubic meter reservoir, rivaling the Egyptian High Aswan Dam of 1970 and having a total storage capacity of nearly 1.2 times the average annual flow of the Blue Nile, calls to question whether the GERD is more about controlling water flow than producing hydropower. Thus, the GERD challenges the Egyptian hydro-hegemony by having more influence over the water flow, ensuring Egypt will “behave in a more cooperative and accommodating way”.
Whilst in the next post, I will delve more deeply into the costs and benefits of the GERD, for now, it is time to recognise that since the GERD’s establishment there has been no arranged agreement reached between the Eastern Nile states concerning the key issues of dam operation and regulation. Consequently, the unilateral establishment of the GERD is only the unfortunate reality resulting from years of a lack of compromise between riparian states.
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